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 Transitional justice programs traditionally focused on breaches of civil and 
political rights and violations of bodily integrity, largely ignoring violations of 
economic and social rights (ESRs) and relegating socioeconomic issues to the 
category of ‘background’ or context.  This approach is becoming increasingly 
untenable given that ESRs articulate binding and increasingly justiciable legal 
obligations.  Considering past ESR violations can also provide crucial insight into the 
causes of past conflict, and addressing socioeconomic grievances can help to reduce 
the chances of future rights violations or civil unrest.  This Article sets out when 
transitional justice ought concern itself with breaches of ESRs using the ‘respect, 
protect, fulfill’ framework of state obligations.  Drawing on past examples, the 
Article argues that failures to respect and protect ESRs are usually discrete enough 
to be included in the mandates of truth commissions, reparations schemes, and, in 
some cases, criminal prosecutions.  Decentralization programs and the vetting of 
corrupt economic actors can also effectively address past ESR violations and lead to 
socioeconomic improvements.  Addressing state failures to fulfill ESRs is a more 
complicated question, although there are occasions where such violations should be 
included in transitional justice mandates.  Ultimately, transitional justice can no 
longer ignore that ESRs articulate non-negotiable and clearly defined standards, 
which often hold the key to stable and sustainable political transitions. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The field of transitional justice traditionally focused on breaches of civil and 
political rights when seeking to respond to periods of conflict, systemic rights 
violations, and political transition.  Early instantiations of transitional justice 
generally ignored violations of economic and social rights (ESRs) or relegated them 
to issues of “background” or context.1  While some transitional justice mechanisms 
may not be well suited to effectively respond to ESR violations, to completely 
exclude ESRs from transitional justice programs is imprudent.  Socioeconomic 
grievances often figure as an important element to the dynamics of past conflict or 
atrocity and thus need to be investigated and understood.  Properly addressing ESR 
 
 1.   See, e.g., Dustin N. Sharp, Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition: Toward a 
Positive-Peace Paradigm for Transitional Justice, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 780, 781–83 (2012) [hereinafter 
Sharp, Addressing] (noting that transitional justice has historically treated economic violations as “little 
more than useful context”). 
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violations can also help to prevent recurrence of rights violations or conflict. Further, 
ESRs are now justiciable in many forums.2  The reasons for, and instances of, the 
inclusion of ESRs in transitional justice programs are detailed in Part I.  Despite 
these considerations, many commentators advocate for exercising caution when 
considering whether to include ESRs within transitional justice mandates, arguing 
that addressing ESRs can lead a project into the realms of development, which 
requires tools and strategies that differ from those employed in transitional justice.3  
Part II explores these arguments.  It then seeks to refute those concerns by exposing 
erroneous assumptions regarding civil and political rights as compared with ESRs, by 
debunking misplaced assumptions about how ESRs can and cannot be productively 
incorporated into transitional justice mandates, and by addressing certain practical 
considerations that can facilitate such incorporation. 
 In Part III the Article sets out when transitional justice ought to concern itself 
with breaches of ESRs using the ‘respect, protect, fulfill’ framework of state 
obligations and by considering past examples.  State failures to respect and protect 
ESRs are generally discrete enough to be effectively included in transitional justice 
mandates.  For instance, truth commission mandates now often include economic 
crimes or other forms of socioeconomic injustice,4 and international criminal courts 
have used the crimes of enslavement, persecution, and genocide to prosecute crimes 
that include violations of ESRs.5  Whether to include violations of the obligation to 
fulfill ESRs, which include notions of progressive achievement subject to a nation’s 
“available resources,”6 is a more complicated question.  Nonetheless, various 
transitional justice mechanisms have the potential to meet failures to fulfill ESRs at 
the community level.  Reparations schemes and decentralized governance have led to 
the better fulfillment of ESRs in traditionally marginalized communities,7 and vetting 
processes can be used to root out corrupt public officials and to exclude complicit 
corporate actors from conducting business.  Such efforts can strengthen economic 
governance and increase the amount of state revenue to be spent on health, 
education, welfare, and other ESRs.8  Nationwide failures to fulfill ESRs will require 
extensive funding and sustained policy implementation and are therefore less suited 
to transitional justice responses.  Nonetheless, the examples explored in this Article 
indicate how governments can capitalize on the opportunity presented by periods of 
 
 2.   See infra notes 45–51 and accompanying text. 
 3.   See, e.g., Roger Duthie, Transitional Justice, Development, and Economic Violence, in JUSTICE 
AND ECONOMIC VIOLENCE IN TRANSITION 165, 172–73 (Dustin N. Sharp ed., 2014) (noting that the 
mechanics for achieving transitional justice differ from those used in development because “they are 
conceptually distinct initiatives that rest on separate grounds and relate to different dimensions of 
justice”). 
 4.   See infra Part III.A. 
 5.   See infra Part III.C. 
 6.   International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2 para. 1, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (“Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively 
the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”). 
 7.   See infra Part III.D–F. 
 8.   See infra Part III.H. 
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transition to engrain ESRs into the fabric of a country’s political culture and legal 
regime, which can positively impact on the future fulfillment of ESRs. 
A. Cultural Rights? 
 This Article focuses on economic and social rights, rather than the usual 
grouping of economic, social, and cultural rights.  However, this should not be 
regarded as denigrating the importance and indivisibility of cultural rights from other 
human rights.  It is implicit in this Article’s analysis that ESRs must be fulfilled 
through culturally specific and appropriate policies, and that cultural rights enshrined 
in instruments like the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) are inviolable and indivisible.  Indeed, the enforcement of the 
rights to culture and religion can lead to stronger and more secure socioeconomic 
entitlements, such as the articulation of indigenous or customary land rights.9  This 
Article focuses on ESRs because these rights are most closely aligned to projects of 
development and are thus most often argued to be outside the bounds of transitional 
justice.  It seeks to critique and clarify such arguments. 
I. THE GRADUAL INCLUSION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS 
 Transitional justice is concerned with achieving broad notions of justice, and 
maintaining peace and stability following a period of widespread human rights 
abuses and, usually,10 a political transition.11  Transitional justice mechanisms (truth 
commissions, prosecutions of human rights violations, reparations programs, vetting 
processes, memorials, and so on) tend to evaluate past wrongs against the standards 
and norms established by human rights and international humanitarian law.12  Early 
instantiations of transitional justice focused on violations of civil and political rights 
 
 9.   See, e.g., U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Views: Communication No. 1457/2006, paras. 7.6–7.7, Commc’n 
1457/2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 (Apr. 24, 2009); Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. v. Kenya, 
Commc’n 276/2003, (2009) A.H.R.L.R. 75, para. 209. 
 10.   Compare, for example, Morocco’s Equality and Reconciliation Commission, which was 
implemented by royal decree of King Mohammad IV in 2004 after five years on the throne.  Dahir (Royal 
Decree) no. 1.04.42 10 of April 2004 approving Statutes of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission, 
available at http://www.ier.ma/article.php3?id_article=1395. 
 11.   Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 69 (2003) 
(“Transitional justice can be defined as the conception of justice associated with periods of political 
change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 12.   Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The New Landscape of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:  BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE 1, 2 (Naomi Roht-Arriza & Javier 
Mariezcurrena eds., 2006) [hereinafter Roht-Arriaza, The New Landscape]; Evelyne Schmid & Aoife 
Nolan, ‘Do No Harm’?  Exploring the Scope of Economic and Social Rights in Transitional Justice, 8 INT’L 
J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 1, 3–4 (2014) (noting that the field of human rights, along with international 
criminal law and international humanitarian law, is the most frequently invoked normative framework 
invoked by transitional justice scholars and practitioners) (citing U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law 
and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies:  Rep. of the Secretary-General, para. 9, U.N. 
Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004)). 
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at the expense of examining economic or social wrongs.13  For instance, Argentina’s 
National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (known by its Spanish 
acronym, CONADEP) focused on disappearances, assassinations, and the treatment 
of those detained by the Argentine military.14  The truth commissions of Chile 
(focusing on deaths, disappearances, and kidnappings),15 El Salvador (“serious acts of 
violence”),16 and Uruguay (enforced disappearances)17 also gave most of their 
attention to violations of bodily integrity, leaving ESRs relatively unaddressed.18  
Similarly, the enabling legislation of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission limited the definition of “victim” to those who suffered gross human 
rights violations including killing, abduction, or torture, effectively relegating the 
structural economic violence of the apartheid system to be considered only as 
context.19 
A. Understanding the Dynamics of Past Conflict and Atrocity 
 Many commentators recognize that focusing on violations of bodily integrity or 
political rights risks distorting understandings of the nature of past conflicts and 
violence.20  While ideology, entrenched ethnic divisions, or other political grievances 
will often be a factor, many conflicts can count among their causes discontent 
regarding resource allocation or poor economic management, which directly impact 
socioeconomic rights.21  For instance, the mass demonstrations that lead to large-scale 
 
 13.   Sharp, Addressing, supra note 1, at 781–83; see also Zinaida Miller, Effects of Invisibility:  In 
Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 266, 267 (2008) (“The 
literature, institutions and international enterprise of transitional justice historically have failed to 
recognize the full importance of structural violence, inequality and economic (re)distribution to conflict, 
its resolution, transition itself and processes of truth or justice seeking and reconciliation.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 14.   See generally Emilio Crenzel, Argentina’s National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons:  
Contributions to Transitional Justice, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 173 (2008). 
 15.   Law No. 355, Abril 25, 1990, para. 1, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]. 
 16.   U.N. Comm’n on the Truth for El Salvador, From Madness to Hope:  The 12-Year War in El 
Salvador, 11, U.N. Doc. S/25500 (1993). 
 17.   Or “las desapariciones forzadas” in the original text.  Resolución de la Presidencia de la 
República No. 858/200, pfo. 1, Diario Oficial [DO] No. 25.853, 9 de Agosto de 2000 (Uru.). 
 18.   Dustin N. Sharp, Interrogating the Peripheries:  The Preoccupations of Fourth Generation 
Transitional Justice, 26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 149, 169–70 (2013) [hereinafter Sharp, Interrogating]. 
 19.   Sharp, Addressing, supra note 1, at 793; Dustin N. Sharp, Economic Violence in the Practice of 
African Truth Commissions and Beyond, in JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC VIOLENCE IN TRANSITION, supra 
note 3, at 79, 86 [hereinafter Sharp, Economic]; Lars Waldorf, Anticipating the Past:  Transitional Justice 
and Socio-Economic Wrongs, 21 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 171, 175–76 (2012). 
 20.   Miller, supra note 13, at 266; Sharp, Addressing, supra note 1, at 782–83; Sharp, Interrogating, 
supra note 18, at 170–71; Chandra Lekha Sriram, Liberal Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice:  What 
Place for Socioeconomic Concerns?, in JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC VIOLENCE IN TRANSITION, supra note 3, 
at 27, 35; cf. Ruben Carranza, Plunder and Pain:  Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and 
Economic Crimes?, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 310, 330 (2008) (“[T]he exclusion of corruption and 
economic crimes from transitional justice mechanisms does not necessarily mean that the role of these 
violations in abuse and conflict is being diminished.  A popular view is that transitional justice is meant to 
address one part of the problem with the hope that it can contribute to the solution of the whole.”). 
 21.   See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in JUSTICE 
AND ECONOMIC VIOLENCE IN TRANSITION, supra note 3, at 109, 110 [hereinafter Roht-Arriaza, 
Reparations] (“The underlying causes of armed conflict tend to be structural and resource related as often 
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violence in Tunisia,22 Egypt,23 and Yemen24 all had pressing socioeconomic concerns 
at their base, including poverty, unemployment, and corruption.  Socioeconomic 
grievances also led to the 1932 massacre in El Salvador of over 30,000 peasants and 
farm-laborers:  The victims had sought to revolt because of concerns regarding land 
distribution and stark socioeconomic inequality.25 
 Rule by dictatorial or rights-violating regimes will also often lead to widespread 
economic and social deficiencies and stark societal inequality,26 or may even involve 
positive breaches of social and economic rights.  For instance, education can be co-
opted by the government and used as a propaganda tool, and populations can be 
forcibly displaced or subjected to famine.27  Thus, ESR violations can be as 
devastating on populations as violations of bodily integrity28 or other civil and 
political rights—indeed, the division between these two characterizations of right 
violations becomes harder to discern in instances of forcible displacement and the 
use of mass starvation, given the physical impacts on victims that inevitably result.  
Consideration of such factors merely as background or context reinforces the myth 
that socioeconomic issues will be resolved over time,29 or with the advent of 
democracy;30 it also obfuscates the direct and immediate obligations that arise from 
state duties to respect, protect, and fulfill ESRs. 
B. Preventing Recurrence and Fostering Stable Transitions 
 Ignoring ESRs does not only distort historical narratives:  It also risks leaving 
certain causes of past violence unaddressed.  This impedes the type of structural or 
 
as ideological.”); cf. Waldorf, supra note 19, at 175 (challenging the assumption that economic and social 
rights (ESRs) can have a dominant role in causing conflict). 
 22.   Eric Andrew-Gee, Making Sense of Tunisia, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 17, 2011, http://www.newre 
public.com/article/world/81611/making-sense-tunisia (describing the causes of the protests as corruption, 
unemployment, economic stagnation, and restrictions on freedom of the press). 
 23.   Agence France-Presse, Egypt Braces for Nationwide Protests, HERALD, Jan. 25, 2011, http://www 
.herald.co.zw/egypt-braces-for-nationwide-protests/ (noting that the first day of protests that led to the 
sacking of President Mubarak was dubbed “the day of revolt against torture, poverty, corruption and 
unemployment” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 24.   Malika Bilal, Yemen:  Bloody Protests and Broken Agreements, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 27, 2011), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/aljazeeratop102011/2011/12/2011122593511542382.html 
(describing protests “against government corruption, unemployment and woeful economic conditions”). 
 25.   Dermot Keogh, El Salvador 1932:  Peasant Revolt and Massacre, 6 CRANE BAG, no. 2, 1982, at 7, 
7. 
 26.   Roht-Arriaza, Reparations, supra note 21, at 113. 
 27.   Such breaches were recorded by Timor-Leste’s commission.  CHEGA!  THE REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH, AND RECONCILIATION TIMOR-LESTE:  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
124, 125, 161 (2005) [hereinafter CAVR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY].  Another infamous example is the use of 
famine and starvation by Stalin in Soviet Ukraine in 1933.  See, e.g., TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLOODLANDS: 
EUROPE BETWEEN HITLER AND STALIN 24–25 (2010) . 
 28.   See, e.g., CAVR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 27, at 44 (finding that of the 102,800 people 
who died under Indonesia’s rule, 18,600 (18%) were killed while roughly 84,200 (82%) died because of 
hunger or illness, and noting that the number of deaths due to hunger and illness “exceed[s] the total that 
would be expected if the death rate due to hunger and illness had continued as it was in the pre-invasion 
peacetime period”). 
 29.   Miller, supra note 13, at 268. 
 30.   Id. at 276. 
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systemic change required in a transitional context31 and undermines the ability of 
governments and transitional justice programs to prevent recurrence of human rights 
violations.  A failure to address systemic causes of, and the role of inequality in, 
conflict and systemic human rights abuses not only leaves open the possibility of 
renewed violence;32 it may actively contribute to the precariousness of peace by 
reinforcing existing socioeconomic injustices, which can intensify social 
dissatisfaction.33  Ignoring socioeconomic issues may also impede efforts to foster 
stable transitions.  For instance, a recent report noted the national perception that 
the difficulties of Mali’s transition out of civil war stem from a “lack of good 
governance, including in the sectors of justice, education, and health”.34  The 
International Crisis Group also recently emphasized that the fostering of a stable 
transition in the Central African Republic required the prioritization of “economic 
recovery and resource management.”35  At the same time, there may be limits to the 
ability of transitional justice to contend with widespread poverty and other issues of 
development.  Exactly how transitional justice can grapple with issues of poverty and 
state failures to fulfill ESRs is considered in the following Subpart. 
C. The Increasing Justiciability of Breaches of Economic and Social Rights 
 One explanation for the initial reluctance to consider ESRs by transitional 
justice institutions is tied to inherited biases and conceptions of hierarchies between 
different types of human rights.36  These still exist despite authoritative 
characterizations of all human rights as “universal, indivisible and interdependent 
and interrelated.”37  This perceived hierarchy is based in part on the provision in the 
ICESCR for progressive achievement, to the maximum of a State’s available 
resources, of the rights contained therein,38 as opposed to the ostensibly more 
tangible responsibilities imposed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
 
 31.   See id. at 280–81 (“The failure to include economic concerns in transitional justice mechanisms 
tends to make transition into a political rather than economic story, limiting knowledge of the economic 
underpinnings of conflict, narrowing the story of regime change and quelling discussion of development 
plans by quarantining them within the state and the executive rather than making them part of the 
transitional justice conversation.”). 
 32.   Id. at 287–90; see also Sharp, Addressing, supra note 1, at 783 (arguing that “‘never again’ has 
little meaning if the self-imposed blind spots of the field distort our understanding of the conflict”). 
 33.   See Miller, supra note 13, at 286 (arguing that a reparations scheme that is employed without a 
deep consideration of the underlying economic drivers of conflict will not lead to structural change or 
resolution of the fundamental origins of the conflict). 
 34.   VIRGINIE LADISCH, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, POSSIBILITIES AND CHALLENGES 
FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN MALI 4 (2014), available at https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-
Briefing-Mali-Assessment-2014.pdf. 
 35.   Int’l Crisis Grp., Central African Republic: A Transition at Risk, INT’L CRISIS GRP. BLOG (Oct. 7, 
2014), http://blog.crisisgroup.org/africa/2014/10/07/central-african-republic-a-transition-at-risk. 
 36.   Sharp, Addressing, supra note 1, at 796; see also Waldorf, supra note 19, at 173 (“[T]ransitional 
justice has been heavily influenced by human rights and, as such, has replicated that discpline’s 
longstanding legalistic bias towards civil and political rights . . . .”); cf. Schmid & Nolan, supra note 12, at 
2–3 (responding to and critiquing traditional views of transitional justice, which tend to minimize the 
import of economic and social rights). 
 37.   World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration]. 
 38.   ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 2, para. 1. 
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Rights.39  However, the ICESCR still creates obligations for States.  Specifically, the 
duty to “take steps” is an immediate and concrete obligation.40  In addition, States 
parties have duties to respect, protect, and fulfill economic, social, and cultural rights 
(ESCRs).41  The obligation to respect prohibits state interference with individuals’ 
exercise or enjoyment of ESCRs.42  The obligation to protect requires States to 
prevent third parties from violating those rights.43  The obligation to fulfill requires 
States to take appropriate steps toward the full realization of ESCRs, which includes 
obligations for both immediate and progressive action.44 
ESR obligations are also increasingly justiciable:  They are enshrined in some 
States’ constitutions,45 or constitutional jurisprudence,46 as well as in some regional 
human rights regimes.47  In addition, the recent Optional Protocol to the ICESCR 
creates a process for individual communications to the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.48  There exist many other international instruments in 
which ESCRs are enshrined,49 as well as the provision for similar rights under 
customary international law50 and international humanitarian law.51  The increasing 
 
 39.   See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 19, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. 
NO.  95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 172 [hereinafter ICCPR] (requiring that each State Party to the Covenant protect 
the rights provided for by the Covenant and undertake measures to ensure their protection). 
 40.   Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Rep. on its 5th Sess., Nov. 26–Dec. 14, 1990, annex 3, at 
83, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1991) (“[W]hile the full realization of the relevant rights may be achieved 
progressively, steps towards that goal must be taken within a reasonably short time after the Covenant’s 
entry into force for the States concerned. Such steps should be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly 
as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in the Covenant.”). 
 41.   Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Rep. on its 24th Sess., Nov. 13–Dec. 1, 2000, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2000/13 (Oct. 2, 2000) (“Like civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights impose 
three different types of obligations on States: the obligations to respect, protect and fulfill.  Failure to 
perform any one of these three obligations constitutes a violation of such rights.”). 
 42.   Id. 
 43.   Id. 
 44.   See Schmid & Nolan, supra note 12, at 6 (outlining examples and methods that States can use to 
realize their obligations). 
 45.   See, e.g., CONSTITUTION, art. 43 (2010) (Kenya) (right to health, adequate housing, food, water, 
social security, and education); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA, art. 20 (right to 
education); S. AFR. CONST., 1996, arts. 22 (freedom of trade, occupation, and profession), 26 (right to 
adequate housing), 27 (right to health care, food, water, and social security), 29 (right to education). 
 46.   See, e.g., Narayan v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 348, 354–55 (India) (implying right to health from 
right to life); Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180, 189–90 (India) (implying right to 
“livelihood” and, effectively, adequate shelter from the right to life). 
 47.   See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, opened for signature June 27, 1981, O.A.U. 
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, arts. 14 (right to property), 15 (right to work), 16 (right to health), 17 (right to 
education), 21 (right to free disposal of wealth and natural resources); Association of South East Asian 
Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, 21st Summit (Nov. 19, 2012), arts. 27 (right to 
work), 28 (right to adequate standard of living), 29 (right to health), 30 (right to social security), 31 (right 
to education). 
 48.   Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 
63/117, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008) (effective May 2013). 
 49.   See Sharp, Addressing, supra note 1, at 795 n.49 (citing various intergovernmental documents 
incorporating economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCRs)). 
 50.   U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, para. 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.69 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
 51.   Id.; see Duthie, supra note 3, at 185 (“[U]nlawful interference with people’s health, housing, food, 
water, or education, [] can constitute the crimes of willful killing, unlawful deportation or transfer, 
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number of forums in which individuals can bring claims related to breaches of their 
ESRs clearly indicates one way in which such rights can be addressed by transitional 
justice programs.  Given this development, and the concreteness of obligations 
created by instruments like the ICESCR, it becomes less tenable to argue that 
including ESRs in transitional justice mechanisms is unrealistic or implausible.  Other 
arguments against incorporating ESRs in transitional programs are addressed in Part 
II, below.  Before considering such arguments, the Article, in the following Subpart, 
explores the complexity of determining which types of ESR violations would be most 
appropriately included within mandates of transitional justice processes. 
D. Determining Which Types of Economic and Social Rights Must Be Included 
 Transitional justice mechanisms can no longer turn a blind eye to the violation 
of ESRs.  To do so not only perpetuates anachronistic conceptions of ESRs as lower 
on the hierarchy of rights, it also distorts findings and misaligns policies, which has 
implications for the right to truth and for efforts to avoid recurrence of violence.  To 
downgrade or ignore ESRs is to fail to capitalize on the unique opportunity that 
periods of transition present for reinvention and reform of a State’s legal culture and 
rule of law; rejecting the prospect of strengthening a population’s ESRs may also 
taint the legitimacy of the State’s juridical culture.  Indeed, as discussed below, truth 
commissions are increasingly considering issues of socioeconomic injustice.52  At the 
same time, transitional justice mechanisms, or the government entities creating them, 
will need to prioritize which types of ESR violations will be focused on.  Some issues 
related to ESRs may require sustained and long-term attention and policy to be 
properly understood and addressed, and may thus not be suited to intensive attention 
by transitional justice mechanisms.  Others will be sufficiently discrete and 
remediable to be effectively addressed by a transitional justice program.  It will often 
thus be appropriate for such mechanisms to be given broad mandates, within which 
they can determine specific priorities and areas of focus. 
 More precise delineations as to what should fall within, and outside of, 
transitional justice mandates will depend on the specific context, including the nature 
of past rights violations, and the resource constraints of the institution.53  As Dustin 
Sharp has pithily observed, “[T]here are no easy answers, only trade-offs that must 
be carefully analyzed.”54  What can realistically be considered as fodder for a truth 
commission or other transitional justice process thus merits discussion.  In the 
following Part, this Article considers arguments concerning the limitations or 
incapacities of transitional justice in dealing with ESRs.  In Part III, it goes on to 
explore examples of transitional justice mechanisms that effectively identified and 
responded to ESR violations, or that have had the effect of better fulfilling ESRs. 
 
collective punishment, pillage, destruction of property, attacking cultural property, or starvation . . . .”). 
 52.   See infra Part III.A. 
 53.   See, e.g., Sharp, Economic, supra note 19, at 106 (noting that “while the work of some truth 
commissions is starting to broaden, it is not clear that the budgets and time allocated . . . have increased 
commensurately”). 
 54.   Dustin N. Sharp, Conclusion:  From Periphery to Foreground, in JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC 
VIOLENCE IN TRANSITION, supra note 3, at 289, 294. 
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II. LIMITATIONS OF INCLUDING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS 
A. The Wrong Tools 
 The most convincing reasons advanced for limiting consideration of ESRs by 
transitional justice mechanisms tend to focus on tactics and efficacy—on transitional 
justice’s ability to foster any amount of meaningful socioeconomic change—rather 
than on arguments of principle or doctrinal coherence.  The first argument concerns 
development, rather than specifically addressing breaches of ESRs, but is 
nonetheless relevant given that populations in need of development assistance are 
usually beset by violations of ESRs.55  Societies emerging from authoritarianism or 
conflict are often affected by poverty, damaged infrastructure, and low levels of 
governance and social capital.56  Such problems can be characterized as within the 
bounds of the project of development, rather than of transitional justice.  
Transitional justice and development will interact in many different ways, but 
ultimately, so the argument goes, the tools of transitional justice are not suited to 
addressing developmental shortcomings.57  The pursuit of economic development 
(characterized by economic growth distribution)58 or human development (defined as 
the enlargement of people’s choices)59 are both long-term projects, requiring decades 
of applied policy consideration.  Transitional justice in a given country, on the other 
hand, tends to have a relatively short lifespan.60  Truth commissions, for instance, 
generally have one shot at making recommendations for systemic reforms, and they 
cannot revise their recommendations for socioeconomic policies as conditions on the 
ground change.61  Many transitional justice mechanisms also require a certain level of 
development to operate.62  Transitional justice may thus struggle to achieve long-
lasting socioeconomic development, which weakens the utility of including state 
failures to fulfill ESRs within transitional justice mandates. 
 
 55.   Pablo de Greiff, Articulating the Links between Transitional Justice and Development:  Justice and 
Social Integration, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT:  MAKING CONNECTIONS 28, 29 (Pablo 
de Greiff & Roger Duthie eds., 2009) (“[A] good number of transitional societies face immense 
development challenges, and a good number of developing countries face abiding ‘justice deficits’ 
concerning massive human rights abuses in their pasts.”). 
 56.   Id. at 29–30. 
 57.   See id. at 30–31 (addressing some issues regarding developmental problems in transitional 
regimes); see also Duthie, supra note 3, at 201 (“[Traditional justice] measures are facing different kinds of 
political, legal, and practical challenges and constraints; measures that were initially designed to deal with 
a narrow set of civil and political rights violations cannot necessarily deal as effectively with economic and 
social rights violations without being adapted, without changes in international and national law, and 
without a minimum level of coherence with broader development interventions.”). 
 58.   de Greiff, supra note 55, at 33–34. 
 59.   Id. at 49 (quoting U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990, at 1 (1990)). 
 60.   Waldorf, supra note 19, at 179; see also Schmid & Nolan, supra note 12, at 19 (discussing another 
scholar’s view that “transitional justice is inherently concerned with . . . short-term change,” among other 
factors). 
 61.   See Waldorf, supra note 19, at 176–77. 
 62.   Id. at 30–31 (“[T]rials require operative courts; reparations programs require, among other 
things, resources to distribute; even the mildest form of institutional reform, vetting, requires institutions 
strong enough to withstand having personnel removed.”). 
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B. Insufficient Resources 
 A second argument concerns the fact that transitional justice usually operates in 
contexts where state resources are severely limited.63  Transitional justice 
mechanisms are stretched to their limits even without considering breaches of ESRs, 
the investigation of which may require different skills and expertise.  Expanding the 
mandate to include ESRs without a corresponding increase in funding thus risks 
overburdening transitional justice,64 diluting its efficacy.  For instance, truth 
commission findings risk being less concrete, their analysis overly general, and their 
recommendations “utopian” and without distinct mechanisms for achieving the 
desired results.65  Studies have also shown that in jurisdictions where economic crimes 
can be prosecuted, authorities still tend to prioritize the prosecution of more 
traditional crimes.66  The gist of this argument, then, is not that transitional justice is 
necessarily unable to have a practical effect on questions of inequality and 
development, but that if it were to attempt to do so, it would risk neglecting more 
conventional transitional justice endeavors, such as deterring future atrocities and 
upholding the dignity of victims of physical or sexual violence. 
 This argument has even more force where beneficiaries of past socioeconomic 
injustice remain in positions of power:  In seeking to protect their economic interests, 
they may obstruct or undermine transitional justice processes aimed at altering the 
status quo.67  The following Subpart responds to the arguments discussed in Subparts 
A and B, providing reasons why they should not lead to the complete exclusion of 
ESRs within transitional justice programs. 
C. Responses to ‘Limitation’ Arguments 
 The arguments raised in Subparts A and B above do not provide a sufficient 
foundation for the per se freezing out of ESRs from transitional justice.  Several 
issues, in addition to the above discussion of the binding nature of state obligations 
with regards to ESRs, need to be considered.  First, breaches of the obligation to 
respect and protect ESRs will not usually be so aspirational or long-term as to be 
unresponsive to transitional justice mechanisms.  For instance, forced displacement 
(violating the right to an adequate standard of living and housing, among others)68 
can be the subject of truth finding and recommendations; victims can also seek 
restitution or compensation, and those responsible can be prosecuted or otherwise 
held to account.69 
 
 63.   Id. at 40. 
 64.   Id.; Sharp, Interrogating, supra note 18, at 173. 
 65.   de Greiff, supra note 55, at 40. 
 66.   E.g., Duthie, supra note 3, at 190–91. 
 67.   de Greiff, supra note 55, at 41; Duthie, supra note 3, at 189–90. 
 68.   ICESCR, supra note 6, art. 11, para. 1. 
 69.   FEDERICO ANDREU-GUZMÁN, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (2013), https://www.ic 
tj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Research-Brief-Displacement-Criminal-Justice-Andreu-Guzman.pdf 
(“Despite the absence of the crime of forced displacement from its statute, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) addressed displacement through the crime against humanity of “inhuman 
acts,” while the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) statute did include 
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 Second, the project of remedying many civil and political rights violations will 
also often be a long-term or aspirational one,70 yet this has not prevented such issues 
from being included in transitional justice mechanisms.71  For instance, Timor–Leste’s 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (known by its Portuguese 
acronym, CAVR) made recommendations regarding the improvements of the 
nation’s courts, including ensuring sufficient numbers of judges and support staff,72 
which were aimed in part at ensuring the right to fair trial, a civil and political right.73  
Given Timor–Leste’s severely decimated and under-trained judiciary around that 
time,74 such a recommendation was as long-term and aspirational as any of CAVR’s 
recommendations regarding ESRs.  This undermines arguments that ESRs ought to 
be excluded from transitional justice projects because of their long-term or 
aspirational nature. 
 Third, while transitional justice measures require a baseline of development and 
resources to be effective,75 countries that lack such resources at the time of transition 
ought not exclude having aims targeted at socioeconomic improvement.  
Governments can strategically sequence different processes aimed at remedying ESR 
violations so that they occur at a time where such redress or fulfillment is plausible.  
International financial or aid assistance can also be leveraged to increase a country’s 
capacity to properly address ESR violations. 
 Fourth, concerns that including ESR violations will dilute the impact of a 
transitional justice mechanism do not necessarily mean that violations of ESRs 
should be excluded.  This would undermine the notion of all human rights being 
“universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.”76  Rather, such concerns 
indicate that considering all issues concerning civil and political rights and ESRs may 
not be possible and that determining which violations of which rights ought to be 
considered in detail by a transitional justice mechanism will thus depend on the 
particular context.  The effects of breaches of ESRs can be as deleterious as breaches 
 
deportation and the transfer of civilians as war crimes, and deportation as a crime against humanity.”). 
 70.   Schmid & Nolan, supra note 12, at 13 (giving the example of extra-judicial executions, which 
ought attract an immediate remedy as well as an aspiration to change the nation’s law enforcement culture 
over time to ensure a more effective protection of the right to life). 
 71.   Id. at 18. 
 72.   CAVR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 27, at 174–76. 
 73.   ICCPR, supra note 39, art. 14(1) (“[E]veryone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”). 
 74.   Shane Marshall, Justice, Fed. Court Austl., The East Timorese Judiciary:  At the Threshold of 
Self-Sufficiency?, Address to the Conference of Supreme and Federal Court Judges at Darwin, Australia 
(Dec. 20, 2004), available at http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/publications/judges-speeches/justice-marshall/ 
marshall-J-20041220 (discussing Timor-Leste’s appointment of its first eight judges and two prosecutors in 
2000); Shane Marshall, Justice, Fed. Court Austl., Update to The East Timorese Judiciary:  At the 
Threshold of Self-Sufficiency?, Co-operating with Timor-Leste Conference at Victoria University in 
Melbourne, Australia (June 17, 2005), available at http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/publications/judges-
speeches/justice-marshall/ marshall-j-20050617 (noting that in 2005 all twenty-two of Timor-Leste’s judges, 
as well as all prosecutors and public defenders that were assessed, failed their examinations and 
evaluations and were thus suspended from duty). 
 75.   See Marcus Lenzen, Roads Less Traveled?  Conceptual Pathways (and Stumbling Blocks) for 
Development and Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT:  MAKING 
CONNECTIONS, supra note 55, at 76, 103 n.13 (noting that “severe underdevelopment and resource scarcity 
put constraints on the implementation of transitional justice measures”). 
 76.   Vienna Declaration, supra note 37. 
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of civil and political rights, and deciding which rights should or should not be 
included requires nuance and careful attention, rather than an inflexible, binary 
approach. 
 Fifth, even if transitional justice is completely ill-equipped to solve a 
socioeconomic problem, that does not mean that failures to fulfill ESRs should be 
ignored:  Their mere acknowledgement can re-articulate state obligations and ensure 
that such breaches cannot be merely explained away as a problem of insufficient 
resources.77  Further, while such problems may be regarded as coming within the 
bounds of development, their articulation as human rights violations provides policy 
makers with guidance regarding what the law requires, based on international 
consensus and elaboration by human rights bodies and experts.  Conceiving of 
individuals as rights holders, as opposed to beneficiaries of development programs, 
also reaffirms their dignity and agency, and empowers them to shape their own 
development and assert their rights.78 
 Finally, when targeting embedded patronage networks and other sources of 
corruption, the precariousness of peace must be taken into account.79  Where vetting 
or prosecution of corrupt economic actors poses a significant risk of re-igniting 
conflict or campaigns of atrocity, the type of mechanism used to address ESR 
violations should be carefully considered.  Reparations measures stand as the most 
likely candidate for an undisruptive and immediate response to past ESR violations, 
but future vetting or prosecution programs, or structural reforms, should not be ruled 
out.  The incremental transitional justice advances, with the help of significant civil 
society activity, in Argentina and Morocco illustrate that measures regarded as 
risking destabilization at one point in time may become more plausible after the 
passing of time and the gradual change of power dynamics and governance 
structures.80 
III. EFFECTIVE WAYS OF INCLUDING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS WITHIN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MANDATES 
A. Truth Finding 
 Truth commissions can play multiple roles with regard to violations of ESRs.  
First, the mandates of truth commissions often call for the scrutiny of systemic or 
 
 77.   See Schmid & Nolan, supra note 12, at 18 (arguing that similar inabilities to fulfill civil and 
political rights, such as a failure to achieve sustainable rule of law reforms following a period in which 
extrajudicial executions were prevalent, do not mean that transitional justice is ill-equipped to consider 
those rights violations, and extending this logic to economic and social rights and socio-economic 
development). 
 78.   Philip Alston, The Two Words That Scare the World Bank, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/philip-alston-the-world-bank-treats-human-rights-as-unmention 
able/2014/11/07/9091dafa-65da-11e4-9fdc-d43b053ecb4d_story.html (“[R]ights language recognizes the 
dignity and agency of all individuals and is intentionally empowering.”). 
 79.   Sam Szoke-Burke, Searching for the Right to Truth:  The Impact of International Human Rights 
Law on National Transitional Justice Policies, 33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2015) (on file with 
author). 
 80.   Id. 
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structural causes of atrocity, which will naturally invite consideration of ESRs and 
socioeconomic conditions.81  This also aligns with the right of victims and society in 
general to the truth about past human rights violations.82  The right to truth has 
achieved lex lata with regard to “serious” human rights violations,83 such as torture 
and disappearances, and should also extend, at least as a matter of lex ferenda, to 
knowing the truth of breaches of ESRs.  Truth commissions are, then, in a good 
position to reveal the workings of socioeconomic injustice. 
 Thus far, the types of ESR violations considered by truth commissions generally 
fall within the duties to respect or protect such rights.  CAVR fostered important 
revelations, using the terminology of ESRs,84 regarding forced displacement and 
famine,85 as well as the use of education for propaganda,86 among others. Chad’s 
commission did not characterize economic violence as breaches of economic rights, 
but it did uncover how the State routinely seized assets of political prisoners, passing 
them on to members of the State’s secret police force (the DDS), regime loyalists, 
and even the DDS itself when funds ran low.87  Sierra Leone’s commission 
documented looting and extortion,88 and Liberia’s commission drew links between 
endemic corruption and the limitation or removal of educational and other 
socioeconomic opportunities, as well as considering land issues.89 
 Broader issues of development and social marginalization fitting within state 
failures to fulfill ESRs have also been included in truth commission findings.  Timor–
Leste’s CAVR found that Indonesia’s “overriding preoccupation with security,” its 
“authoritarian style of government,” and its “close collaboration with special 
interests,” led it to breach its duty to fulfill ESRs.90  Similarly, the Kenyan Truth, 
 
 81.   de Greiff, supra note 55, 35–36. 
 82.   See, e.g., Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 
para. 177 (July 29, 1988) (noting that the State has an obligation to perform an “effective search for the 
truth”); El-Masri v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Maced., 2012-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 333 para. 191 
(discussing the applicability of the right to truth). 
 83.   Gonzales v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 80/11, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 69 para. 193 (2011) (holding that in the context of a repeated violation of the right 
to life, “[a] critical component of the right to access information is the right of the victim, her family 
members and society as a whole to be informed of all happenings related to a serious human rights 
violation”). 
 84.   CHEGA!  THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH, AND RECONCILIATION 
TIMOR-LESTE, pt. 2, para. 130 [hereinafter CAVR REPORT] (explaining the difference between economic, 
social, and cultural rights in contrast with political and cultural rights). 
 85.   See id. pt. 7.3, para. 3 (“Often displacement is in effect a form of arbitrary collective punishment, 
and as such is associated with violations of a range of human rights, civil and political as well as economic, 
social and cultural.”). 
 86.   See id. pt. 7.9, para. 122 (“In addition to the poor facilities and teaching, a fundamental problem 
with the education system under the Indonesians was what was taught.  Rather than focusing on basic 
learning needs, the curriculum was explicitly oriented towards pro-Indonesian propaganda.”). 
 87.   Sharp, Economic, supra note 19, at 92–93 (citing the Commission d’Enquête du Ministère Chadien 
de la Justice and Les Crimes et Détournements de l’ex- Président Habré et de Ses Complices). 
 88.   Id. at 96–97 (citing SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, 2 WITNESS TO TRUTH:  
REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 35 (2004)). 
 89.   Id. at 100 (quoting REPUBLIC OF LIBER. TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, 2 CONSOLIDATED 
FINAL REPORT 16–17 (2009)). 
 90.   CAVR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 27, at 141 (“[T]he Commission has also found that the 
Indonesian State failed to realise the economic and social rights of the East Timorese people to the 
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Justice and Reconciliation Commission noted that ESRs created a duty to fulfill 
minimum core obligations, a duty which was “not only a normative but . . . also a 
practical standard.”91  While the Commission did not go on to expressly articulate 
breaches of the duty to fulfill, it found widespread instances of marginalization, 
whose indicators—public infrastructure, employment, education, health, housing, 
access to land, water, sanitation, and food security—overlapped with ESR 
standards.92  The type of marginalization that communities experienced was found to 
vary, depending on the area:  Provinces lacking natural resources received less 
government assistance, while those that had resources suffered government 
mismanagement93 or exclusion from development projects.94 
 A second role that truth commissions can play is to characterize socioeconomic 
marginalization as violations of ESRs, in addition to constituting issues of 
development.  This reframes the issue as one involving breaches of governmental 
obligations, the content of which has often already been considered and articulated 
by leading human rights jurists and experts.95  Using rights language also provides 
civil society with a platform for advocacy,96 and can protect public interest 
organizations from being delegitimized as subversive for seeking structural changes.97  
One commentator argues that the Guatemalan Commission on Historical 
Clarification’s recommendations for progressive tax reform and increased spending 
on human development would have been more difficult for the government to ignore 
 
maximum extent possible, and that at the end of the occupation, East Timor’s development still lagged 
well behind that of even the poorest Indonesian provinces.”). 
 91.   TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N, KENYA, 2B REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE 
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION para. 33 (2013) [hereinafter TJRC REPORT].  The Commission’s 
mandate was to “establish an accurate, complete and historical record of violations and abuses of human 
and economic rights” and to “[i]nquire into and establish the reality of otherwise of perceived economic 
marginalisation of communities and make recommendations on how to address the marginalisation.”  Id. 
para 16.  The Liberian Truth Commission was the only other commission at the time whose mandate 
included ESRs.  Id. para. 18. 
 92.   KENYA TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE NETWORK, SUMMARY:  TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION REPORT 14–15 (2013) [hereinafter KENYA SUMMARY], available at http://www.acordinter 
national.org/silo/files/kenya-tjrc-summary-report-aug-2013.pdf 
 93.   TJRC REPORT, supra note 91, para. 8 (noting testimonies that described how the Central 
Province’s fortunes “dwindled under the then President Moi”), para. 10 (“[A] sense of marginalisation 
exists even in regions regarded as relatively more endowed in resources than others.”), para. 14 (“While 
Kajiado is perhaps rightly ranked as the richest county (based largely on asset-based assessment), its 
residents have some of the lowest levels of access to social goods such as education, health, water and 
sanitation and physical infrastructure such as roads and can rightly claim marginalisation.  In the 
Commission’s view, however, this phenomenon seems to present a case of mismanagement of resources or 
outright corruption.  Resources that could improve the socio-economic condition of locals have either not 
been tapped, or have been diverted to other extraneous issues.”). 
 94.   KENYA SUMMARY, supra note 92, at 14–15. 
 95.   See, e.g., Chris Albin-Lackey, Corruption, Human Rights, and Activism:  Useful Connections and 
Their Limits, in JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC VIOLENCE IN TRANSITION, supra note 3, at 139, 140–41 
(distinguishing “positive” governmental human rights obligations from “negative” obligations). 
 96.   Cf. Sharp, Addressing, supra note 1, at 803 (“[I]f framed properly, [. . .] recommendations 
[addressing socioeconomic inequalities] might nevertheless serve as a strong lobbying platform for civil 
society actors who wish to press for reforms.”). 
 97.   Cf. Lisa J. Laplante, Transitional Justice and Peace Building:  Diagnosing and Addressing the 
Socioeconomic Roots of Violence through a Human Rights Framework, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 
331, 351 (2008) (arguing that truth commissions enable people to advocate for structural change with less 
fear of prosecution). 
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if they were framed as rights violations.98  It must be noted that while using rights 
language is certainly not detrimental to the prospects that reforms will be adopted, 
truth commission articulation of ESR violations is unlikely to be the silver bullet that 
motivates governmental action.  Even truth commission recommendations regarding 
civil and political rights are often not implemented.99  Political will is the necessary 
ingredient, and using the language of rights and violations can help to catalyze civil 
society as well as increasing pressure on, and shifting the will of, those exercising 
political power. 
 A third function of truth commissions is to make recommendations for reform 
to prevent or minimize recurrence of ESRs violations.  Such recommendations are 
more likely to be effective when based on the sort of deep understanding of past 
events that commissions can possess after months or years of public inquiry.  While 
understanding past violations is not in itself sufficient to be able to prevent 
recurrence,100 it is an important starting point.  Truth commissions cannot offer 
sustained monitoring and adjustment of socioeconomic policies necessary for long-
term development,101 but when they are staffed by appropriately qualified 
commissioners, they can set into action mechanisms that increase the chances that 
policies and programs will address ESRs.  Thus, truth commission recommendations 
can address failures to respect and protect ESRs, and can sometimes also set into 
motion government programs and policies to address failures to fulfill them, such as 
reforms designed to decentralize government decision-making or facilitate 
participatory budgeting by communities.  Having established that truth commissions 
can indeed play an important role with regard to violations of ESRs, this Article, in 
the next Subpart, considers what this might look like in practice; specifically, it 
explores the question of whether a separate commission would be best placed to 
consider violations of ESRs, or whether it would be preferable to have a single truth 
commission that manages a mandate including civil and political, as well as economic 
and social, rights. 
B. A Separate Commission Focusing on Economic and Social Rights? 
 The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has noted that 
consideration of ESRs requires a different set of skills and expertise than those 
needed to properly address traditional grave breaches of human rights.102  Given the 
potential concerns of diluting a truth commission’s mandate, or the over-stretching of 
its resources, one alternative is for the investigation of ESRs to be undertaken by a 
separate body, such as a marginalization and social justice commission or a separate 
arm of a truth commission, which possesses the necessary technical expertise to 
appropriately respond to such violations.  Because ESRs demand a different skill set, 
 
 98.   Id. at 350–51. 
 99.   See, e.g., Duthie, supra note 3, at 196–97 (discussing numerous instances where truth commission 
recommendations concerning various rights were ignored). 
 100.   Cf. de Greiff, supra note 55, at 36 (“[U]nderstanding the dynamics leading to violations may be a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for changing those dynamics . . . .”). 
 101.   See supra Part II.A. 
 102.   Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-conflict States, 9, 
U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/06/1 (2006). 
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a more technocratic body might be best suited to understanding past causes of 
economic and social injustice.  It may also be able to develop sophisticated policies, 
such as tax concessions or other complex financial arrangements that better leverage 
a State’s available resources to provide redress for violations of ESRs, including 
failures to fulfill them. 
 Various countries have created commissions to deal with the challenges posed 
by widespread poverty.  However these have generally been outside of the 
transitional justice context, and are usually not staffed by development economists or 
other independent experts on socioeconomic policy.  For example, Illinois’s 
Commission on the Elimination of Poverty was made up of local and state public 
representatives, and members of civil society organizations concerned with 
homelessness, poverty, health, and food security.103  In contrast, the Commissioners 
of Scotland’s Poverty Truth Commission include individuals who have experienced 
poverty in their own lives as well as government and civil society representatives with 
experience in policy issues including employment and poverty.104  Lastly, the National 
Anti-poverty Commission of the Philippines is staffed by the heads of government 
agencies and representatives from different stakeholder groups, including farmers, 
indigenous people, women, and non-government organizations and is of a different 
nature.105  It has existed for more than ten years, and evaluates and monitors the 
government’s anti-poverty program development and funding.106  These government-
backed bodies can be contrasted with more temporary, civil society-generated 
poverty truth commissions in the United States, that seek to catalyze government 
action on poverty.107 
 The prospect of having a separate, more ESRs-focused commission presents a 
dilemma:  On the one hand, such expertise is needed to make the most of the scarce 
resources available for transitional justice; on the other hand, those resources would 
be consumed more quickly if two bodies, each with their own set of staff and 
processes, operated in tandem.  Implementing a separate poverty commission would 
involve serious tradeoffs, including limiting the extent to which the truth regarding 
civil and political rights can be pursued.  Having a separate commission for ESRs 
could also reinforce anachronistic human rights hierarchies and perpetuate the myth 
 
 103.   Commission Members, COMM’N ON THE ELIMINATION OF POVERTY, http://www.illinois.gov/ 
poverty/Pages/members.aspx (last visited June 15, 2015). 
 104.   The Poverty Truth Commission:  Commissioners, FAITH COMMUNITY SCOT., http://www.faithin 
communityscotland.org/poverty-truth-commission/commissioners/ (last visited June 15, 2015) (“[Our 
commissioners] include the Scottish Government, Glasgow City Council, faith communities, students and 
school leavers, community activists, people involved in the criminal justice system, representatives of 
political parties, academics, refugees, advice services, business leaders, carers and volunteers.”). 
 105.   Letter from President of the Philippines to Secretary Jose Eliseo M. Rocamora, Nat’l Anti-
Poverty Comm’n (Jan. 9, 2012), available at http://maps.napc.gov.ph/drupal/sites/default/files/documents/ 
NAPC_SR_Appointment.pdf. 
 106.   Service Charter, NAT’L ANTI-POVERTY COMM’N, http://maps.napc.gov.ph/drupal/about/ 
servicecharter (last visited June 15, 2015). 
 107.   See, e.g., JAMES EDWARD BEITLER III, REMAKING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  THE RHETORICAL AUTHORIZATION OF THE GREENSBORO TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION 137 (2013) (noting that the Poor People’s Economic Human Rights Campaign held a three-
day commission in Cleveland, Ohio in 2006, and its commissioners included international and domestic 
commissioners, while the Union Theological Seminary’s Poverty Truth Commissions had been staffed 
mainly by religious figures). 
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of economic and social rights as being of secondary importance.  For this reason, 
including both sets of rights within the mandate of a truth commission, or having a 
separate but related ‘arm’ of a commission that is charged with making 
recommendations regarding prevention of ESR violations, is preferable to having a 
distinct commission. 
 A separate commission would also require detailed policies regarding how it 
would interact with its counterpart, civil-and-political-rights-focused commission to 
avoid institutional conflict.  Sierra Leone108 and Peru109 each experienced institutional 
difficulties between their truth commissions and courts, including conflicts as to 
which institution’s proceedings should take priority and failures of one institution to 
pursue investigations referred to it by the other.  The operation of two commissions 
may be easier to manage than the interface between a truth commission and a court 
because there will be less divergence in processes.  Nonetheless, it is foreseeable that 
some of the institutional difficulties that occurred in Sierra Leone and Peru could 
occur in such a setting.  This is not fatal to the idea of having two separate 
commissions, but rather requires a careful approach to policy and procedure.  
Incorporating a poverty commission as a separate arm of the commission could 
potentially reduce (but not eliminate) the potential for institutional conflict by 
limiting the barriers between the different truth finding endeavors.  It might also 
reduce duplicated expenditures by combining resources and sharing facilities and 
support staff.  In addition, there will be more opportunities to share institutional 
knowledge, including being privy to testimony from both arms of the commission. 
 Given that transitional justice contexts will usually be plagued by resource 
shortages, and that additional mechanisms tend to bring added institutional 
complexity and potential for conflict, a separate commission for ESRs will not always 
be a plausible option.  The efforts of truth commissions in Timor–Leste and Kenya 
also indicate that properly staffed commissions can productively address both sets of 
rights.  A more cost-effective way of including technical socioeconomic solutions to 
resource shortages may be to encourage the appearance of expert witnesses at truth 
commission proceedings, or to employ consultants to assist with the design of 
economic or budgetary recommendations and mechanisms, and with other areas 
outside the expertise of commission members. 
C. Litigation 
 Breaches of the duty to respect and protect ESRs, including large-scale 
violations, have been litigated in varying jurisdictions.  The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in Ituango Massacres v. Colombia110 found instances of forced labor111 
 
 108.   See generally Ari Bassin & Paul van Zyl, The Story of Samuel Hinga Norman in Sierra Leone:  
Can Truth Commissions and Criminal Prosecutions Coexist after Conflict?, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
ADVOCACY STORIES 229 (Deena R. Hurwitz et al. eds., 2009). 
 109.   E.g., Eduardo González Cueva, The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Challenge of Impunity, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:  BEYOND TRUTH 
VERSUS JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 70, 83–85 (discussing the processes of truth commissions in transitional 
justice cases). 
 110.   Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 148 (July 1, 2006). 
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and, in relation to forcible displacements, violation of the right to property.112  
Remedies granted included ordering the State to guarantee safe conditions for those 
who were forcibly displaced, to establish a housing plan for their benefit, to 
memorialize the violations, and to pay pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensation to 
named victims.113  The inclusion of ESRs in state constitutions114 provides another 
means of litigation, namely through domestic constitutional claims. 
 In addition, international criminal tribunals have successfully prosecuted 
conduct that violated ESRs, including the rights to work, to an adequate standard of 
living, and to health.115  For example, in Prosecutor v. Brđanin, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia held that Bosnian Serb authorities 
persecuted Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats by inflicting a series of 
socioeconomic deprivations on them.  Specifically, the cumulative effect of the 
authorities’ withholding of medical care and denial of the victims’ rights to 
employment, freedom of movement, and proper judicial process “for the very reason 
of their ethnicity”116 was held to constitute the international crime of persecution.  
Other tribunals have convicted defendants for the crime against humanity of 
enslavement117 and have characterized “subjecting a group of people to a subsistence 
diet, systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential medical services 
below minimum requirement”, each of which violate ESRs, as “deliberate[ly] 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction, in whole or in part,” thus constituting genocide.118 
 Litigation through international human rights bodies, national constitutional 
courts, and international criminal courts has an important role to play in stopping 
impunity and compelling States to compensate victim groups, especially for state 
failures to respect or protect those rights.  Such cases have a remedial role for victims 
and, in theory, a deterrent role for future potential perpetrators.  Addressing such 
issues on a structural level, however, including state failures to fulfill ESRs, will 
generally require policy shifts or truth commission recommendations for institutional 
and budgetary reform.119  Another transitional justice tool that can remedy ESR 
 
 111.   Id. para. 168. 
 112.   Id. para. 183.  The right to property, while not included in the ICESCR, has been described by the 
Independent Expert on the right of everyone to own property alone as well as in association with others as 
“enhancing both personal dignity and fostering socio-economic well-being, and is thus treated as an 
economic and social right for the purposes of this Article.  Independent Expert, The Right of Everyone to 
Own Property Alone as Well as in Association with Others, Comm’n on Hum. Rts. para. 116, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1994/19 (Nov. 25, 1993) (by Luis Valencia Rodríguez). 
 113.   Ituango Massacres, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, paras. 379, 390, 404, 407, 408. 
 114.   See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 115.   ICESCR, supra note 6, arts. 6, 11 and 12. 
 116.  Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, para. 1048 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 
2004); accord OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, at 33–34, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/13/5, U.N. Sales No. 
E.14.XIV.3 (2014) [hereinafter OHCHR]. 
 117.   E.g., Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgement, paras. 2091, 2102, 
2116 (Special Court for Sierra Leone Mar. 2, 2009). 
 118.   Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, para. 506 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998); accord OHCHR, supra note 116, at 35–36. 
 119.   See OHCHR, supra note 116, at 44–45 (“Institutional reform is a key dimension of transitional 
justice because it has the potential to trigger structural change.  However, it is one of the most under 
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violations is the distribution of individual or collective reparations, which are 
considered respectively in the following Subparts. 
D. Reparations 
 Reparations are an intuitive remedy for failures to respect or protect ESRs 
because they involve the transfer of goods, money, or other services to victims, which 
can directly impact on those victims’ socioeconomic position.120  They can also 
enhance the fulfillment of ESRs by improving access to public services.  Reparations 
are thus a useful option for fulfilling the right of victims of ESRs violations to a 
remedy.121  Reparations can include compensation or restitution of land, which can 
increase a recipient’s economic capacity,122 and scholarships or increased access to 
health services, which can remedy violations of the right to education or to health.  
Reparations for gross violations of civil and political rights usually include access to 
goods and services, which has the corollary of bolstering victims’ ESRs and capacity 
for development.123  Collective reparations, considered below, can also address these 
rights on a community level; large-scale reparations such as constructing or 
expanding hospitals, schools, or vital infrastructure can remedy violations of the 
rights to health, education, water, and so on.  Reparations may also expose 
deficiencies that affect more than the immediate pool of victims, potentially acting as 
a catalyst for demands for improvement on a national scale.124 
 There are limitations to resorting to individual reparations as a means of 
remedying ESR violations.  Firstly, including ESRs within the mandate of a 
reparations program, which will already be chronically under-resourced, will expand 
the pool of victims and thus further dilute the available remedies, minimizing their 
restorative potential.125  The gravity of this limitation depends on the breadth of 
rights to be included and the number of persons affected.  For instance, a victim 
whose land was illegally confiscated can have his or her right to property vindicated 
by restitution to the land or, where that is not possible, compensation.  However, 
where the government has breached the right to health or education of a majority of 
the population by denying it adequate services (whether by failing to respect, protect, 
or fulfill those rights), there is little that a reparations scheme can do to remedy that 
violation for all.  Reparations programs are generally too small126 and are focused on 
discrete rights violations, rather than widespread inequality.127 
 
researched and unexplored areas.”). 
 120.   de Greiff, supra note 55, at 37; Duthie, supra note 3, at 172. 
 121.   Cf. Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Katharine Orlovsky, A Complementary Relationship:  Reparations 
and Development, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT:  MAKING CONNECTIONS, supra note 
55, at 170, 171 (discussing the reasons for and advantages of granting reparations in truth commissions). 
 122.   See, e.g., de Greiff, supra note 55, at 37 (noting that reparations that redistribute property rights 
can positively affect victims’ socioeconomic well-being). 
 123.   OHCHR, supra note 116, at 56. 
 124.   See, e.g., de Greiff, supra note 55, at 37–38 (noting that various truth commissions made 
recommendations that would have benefited more than just the direct victims of the previous regimes). 
 125.   Id. at 40. 
 126.   de Greiff, supra note 55, at 39. 
 127.   Sriram, supra note 20, at 44. 
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 A second limitation of employing reparations to address violations of ESRs is 
that they might distort perspectives of systemic problems that require government-
administered, and -monitored, policies of economic redistribution or market reform.  
Reparations may interfere with a State’s duty to fulfill ESRs by masking a continuing 
lack of redistribution, leaving more structural issues in the background and focusing 
on individual instances of socioeconomic harm.128  Reparations programs aimed at 
individual victims may also conflict with, or crowd out discussion of, programs aimed 
at reducing poverty more generally,129 potentially contributing to the continuation of 
inequality or marginalization of specific groups,130 and denying the suffering of 
victims of those less tangible social or economic injustices.131  While these risks are 
very real, they can generally be mitigated by reflective and strategic government 
policies and robust civil society engagement and advocacy.  This is preferable to an 
either/or approach, given that ESRs and the right to remedy are both inviolable and 
indivisible. 
 While reparations are unlikely to foster macroeconomic development directly, 
they do have a useful role to play in rehabilitating victims.  This in turn can enable 
“the (re)emergence of victims and survivors as actors with the initiative, motivation, 
and belief in the future that drive sustainable economic activity.”132  That reparations 
cannot cure poverty ought not mean that they have no role to play.  Rather, this 
should inform exactly which socioeconomic issues are included within the bounds of 
reparation schemes.  Thus, Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission aspired to 
adopt a broad approach to socioeconomic injustice but ultimately separated narrow 
violations (which it addressed) from broader concerns regarding nationwide poverty 
and social problems (which it did not).133  It did, however, make recommendations for 
collective reparations for regions that had been marginalized and that suffered 
increased poverty as a result of the long period of violence.134  The next Subpart 
explores how these types of collective reparations, along with strategic uses of 
decentralization and participatory budgeting, can be employed at a community or 
regional level to meaningfully address violations of ESRs, including failures to fulfill 
ESRs. 
 
 128.   Miller, supra note 13, at 278, 280. 
 129.   See id. at 284 (noting that reparations programs may redistribute power from autocratic to 
democratic institutions, but “[b]y definition” do not redistribute wealth to individuals). 
 130.   Mariclaire Acosta & Esa Ennelin, The “Mexican Solution” to Transitional Justice, in 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:  BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE, supra note 
12, at 110–11 (giving an example of Mexico’s lack of progress in punishing human rights abuses by the 
Mexican military regardless of the creation of a Special Prosecutor’s Office to investigate these issues). 
 131.   See Miller, supra note 13, at 285 (stating that granting aid to a limited class of perceived victims 
can increase “violence springing from resentment on the part of those not categorized as victims”). 
 132.   de Greiff, supra note 55, at 173. 
 133.   Lisa Magarrell, Reparations for Massive or Widespread Human Rights Violations:  Sorting Out 
Claims for Reparations and the Struggle for Social Justice, 22 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 85, 95 (2003) 
(“[Peru’s Comprehensive Reparation Plan (PIR)] cannot and should not be considered as one more 
instrument of social policy.  The PIR does not seek to resolve problems of poverty, exclusion and 
inequality, which are structural in nature and respond to the overall operation of the political and 
economic system.” (quoting COMISIÓN DE LA VERDAD Y RECONCILIACIÓN, INFORME FINAL para. 2.2.2.1 
(2003), as translated by the author of that article)). 
 134.   CRISTIÁN CORREA, REPARATIONS IN PERU:  FROM RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPLEMENTATION 
5–7, (2013), available at http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ_Report_Peru_Reparations_2013.pdf. 
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E. Collective Reparations 
 Collective reparations are forms of distribution of public goods or services that 
are designed for the benefit of all members of a region, group, or community, rather 
than for specific individual victims.135  Collective reparations can address past ESR 
violations, and can be used to fulfill ESRs where recipient communities are in need 
of improvements in social or economic conditions.  Whereas individual reparations 
seek to acknowledge harms to individual victims, collective reparations address 
collective harms and seek to restore social solidarity.136  For instance, in Peru 
collective reparations were regarded as a key tool in addressing the historic 
marginalization of many rural and indigenous communities in the Andes and the 
Amazon, whose support networks, cultural identities, and local economies were 
broken down by years of systematic violence.137 
 Examples of collective reparations include allocation or restitution of land to 
communities for collective ownership and use, improvement of public services and 
infrastructure, restitution of religious or cultural sites, financial projects aimed at 
generating industry or commerce for victim groups, increased access to psychosocial 
support, exhumations of mass grave sites,138 and memorials.139  Additional collective 
reparations measures include decentralization or devolution of government decision-
making and participatory budgeting programs, which are discussed in the following 
two Subparts of this Article.  Such measures are especially attractive when the 
number of potential victims suffering breaches of economic or social rights is so large 
as to render the amount of money that would be payable as individual reparations so 
small as to be insignificant or even offensive to those receiving the reparation.140  
Collective reparations often constitute measures that the government is already duty-
bound to provide:  For instance, the Peruvian Truth Commission’s Integral 
Reparations Program included recommendations to build a hospital,141 which drew 
controversy by those arguing that the right to health demanded such measures 
regardless of the transitional justice context.142  Nonetheless, collective reparations 
stand as one means of seeking to address past failures to fulfill ESRs in specific 
communities or regions. 
 
 135.   Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 121, at 189–90. 
 136.   Id. at 189. 
 137.   CORREA, supra note 134, at 11. 
 138.   Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 121, at 190. 
 139.   Such as the special memorial constructed for traders in Ghana, who were brutalized, both 
physically and economically.  Sharp, Economic, supra note 19, at 95 (citing GHANA NATIONAL 
RECONCILIATION COMM’N, 2 FINAL REPORT 42 (2005)). 
 140.   See Duthie, supra note 3, at 191 (discussing the practical difficulties of providing pecuniary 
reparations in situations of widespread economic rights violations); see also Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, 
supra note 121, at 192 (identifying both the practical advantages and the benefits to individual victims of 
collective reparations). 
 141.   COMISIÓN DE LA VERDAD Y RECONCILIACIÓN, INFORME FINAL para. 2.2.3.2 (2003). 
 142.   CORREA, supra note 134, at 13; Laplante, supra note 97, at 352. 
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F. Decentralization 
 It is often the case that members of certain communities or regions experience 
greater marginalization and other socioeconomic wrongs than in other areas.  In 
order to remedy this, such regions will require policy changes or interventions that 
are attuned to their needs.  Where a government’s services are provided by a 
centralized bureaucracy, usually based in the State’s capital, the effects of past 
marginalization risk remaining unaddressed and even perpetuated.  Truth 
commissions, civil society, and some post-transition governments have sought to 
remedy this problem by decentralizing decision-making—that is, giving increased 
control and authority to local government or community structures—for 
socioeconomic projects and policies.143  Encouraging or mandating mechanisms for 
redistribution that decentralize decision-making can foster socioeconomic 
improvement and encourage the fulfillment of ESRs by enabling regions or 
communities to decide on which development projects and services are most needed 
without interference by the national government.  More localized decision-making 
benefits from a more intimate knowledge of local conditions and needs, and can also 
empower local actors and community members. 
 The examples of Morocco and Peru show how effective decentralization can be 
in a transitional justice context. In Morocco, collective reparations were provided to 
eleven regions previously excluded from development programs.144  Local councils 
determined how certain reparations funds would be spent, based on their 
constituents’ priorities,145 thus overcoming the past neglect of a centralized 
bureaucracy.  A similar decentralization of collective reparations took place in Peru, 
where municipal bodies were given autonomy to determine how to use local and 
national government funding.146  While some regions failed to benefit from the 
opportunity of shaping their own development programs, others consulted with local 
communities to determine budget priorities which better met local needs.147  
Providing reparations funding at the municipal level creates the potential for the 
decentralization of service provision,148 and for policies, which can address the 
socioeconomic issues that may be unique to specific regions.  It bears noting that in 
the case of Peru decentralization was based on areas most affected by violence,149 
rather than those judged to have the greatest need for economic assistance.  This 
creates a conceptual discord, as decentralized funding and economic development 
projects are being employed to remedy widespread violence and violations of civil 
and political rights, rather than to address the socioeconomic problems for which 
they were originally designed.150  Nonetheless, decentralization of the use of collective 
 
 143.   Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 121, at 184. 
 144.   Waldorf, supra note 19, at 172. 
 145.   See, e.g., BIX GABRIEL ET AL., TRANSFORMING SITES OF DETENTION:  A REVIEW OF AND 
ROADMAP FOR REPARATIONS AND MEMORIALIZATION IN MOROCCO 9–11 (2013), available at 
http://www.sitesofconscience.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/FINAL-MOROCCO-REPORT1.pdf 
(noting the roles of local and regional governments in the implementation of reparations in Morocco). 
 146.   Roht-Arriaza, Reparations, supra note 21, at 120. 
 147.   Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 121, at 184. 
 148.   Id. 
 149.   Roht-Arriaza, Reparations, supra note 21, at 120. 
 150.   Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 121, at 191. 
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reparations can ensure region-specific spending, which can help to remedy 
socioeconomic marginalization and strengthen protections of ESRs. 
G. Participatory Budgeting and Oversight 
 Participatory budgeting, closely linked to decentralization, is another potential 
mechanism for fostering economic and social change, and for fulfilling the ESRs 
within specific communities.  It entails creating a mechanism for community 
members, through a representative, deliberative process, to decide how public funds 
designated for a community or region will be spent.151  It is most effective when 
combined with a degree of oversight or monitoring by community members into how 
the projects decided upon are implemented.152  This Subpart considers examples of 
participatory budgeting in the transitional justice settings of Guatemala, Peru, and 
Bolivia. 
 The likelihood of participatory budgeting succeeding is maximized where the 
country’s national government does not seek to interfere or undermine the process.  
One example of governmental interference is Guatemala’s decentralization reforms, 
which were outlined in the 1996 Peace Accords before being codified in 2002.153  The 
Guatemalan government appeared to adopt these measures mainly because of 
international pressure or guidance,154 rather than as part of a good faith effort to give 
greater power to local decision-making.  Consequently, it gave the participatory 
bodies—municipal councils—mainly administrative obligations, rather than a 
meaningful opportunity to participate in decision-making.155  This undermined their 
potential to alter government spending in ways that would maximize the benefit to 
communities. 
 Participatory budgeting policies in Peru and Bolivia have been more successful.  
Peru’s participatory budgeting laws were initiated by President Alejandro Toledo in 
the context of the democratization of Peru following the rule of President Alberto 
Fujimori,156 and were supported by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission.157  The process was lauded for engaging civil society in the debate over 
the expenditure of public resources, as well as increasing the focus on poverty 
alleviation projects.158  Community participation, through election of management 
 
 151.   M.A. Hordijk, Peru’s Participatory Budgeting:  Configurations of Power, Opportunities for 
Change, 2 OPEN URBAN STUD. J. 43, 43 (2009). 
 152.   See, e.g., id. at 53 (comparing the oversight processes of Peru and Brazil’s participatory budgeting 
programs and concluding that even when the oversight process is perceived as weak it nonetheless 
“enables civil society in general to monitor government’s progress” and “offers important opportunities to 
increase citizens’ participation in local decision making”). 
 153.   Benjamin Goldfrank, Presentation to the Latin American Studies Association Meeting:  Lessons 
from Latin American Experience in Participatory Budgeting 7 (Mar. 2006), http://www.international 
budget.org/ themes/PB/LatinAmerica.pdf. 
 154.   Id. at 26–27. 
 155.   Id. at 27. 
 156.   Stephanie McNulty, An Unlikely Success:  Peru’s Top-Down Participatory Budgeting Experience, 
J. PUB. DELIBERATION, Dec. 30, 2012, art. 4, at 2. 
 157.   Laplante, supra note 97, at 354. 
 158.   See, e.g., McNulty, supra note 156, at 1 (characterizing Peru’s engagement of civil society 
organizations in the debate as to how to allocate public resources, as well as the increased focus on 
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committees, led to quick implementation of community-defined projects, most of 
which targeted socioeconomic needs of communities.159  At a local level, the Bolivian 
town of Curahuara de Carangas also benefitted from participatory budgeting, which 
has reinvigorated indigenous institutions, respect for women,160 civic associations, and 
a focus on long-term development and public works and programs.161 
 Despite these successes, some commentators lament that Peru’s use of collective 
reparations as a means of addressing ESRs has occurred at the expense of according 
reparations processes with a significant degree of meaning and symbolism.162  Apart 
from victim confusion about whether such projects were reparative or merely 
development projects, some members of national government also characterized 
reparations as tools for addressing the harms caused by terrorism, rather than also 
addressing the state’s culpability for past violations.163  This illustrates the need for 
clear and consistent messaging from governments regarding the purpose of 
participatory budgeting and collective reparations.  While exhibiting some 
pathologies, participatory budgeting programs have the potential to empower and 
dignify victims, to redress breaches of human rights, and to fulfill ESRs at a local or 
regional level, especially in situations where specific geographical areas have 
previously been marginalized. 
H. Vetting 
 A final tool that can be employed in the transitional justice context to remedy 
breaches of state duties to respect and protect ESRs, and to avoid recurrence of 
breaches, is the strategic use of vetting procedures.  Vetting is usually understood as 
the process of ensuring that public officials personally responsible for gross violations 
of human rights do not continue to serve in state employment.164  For instance, in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, close to 24,000 law enforcement officials were screened for 
involvement in mass atrocities.165  However, where breaches of ESRs were rife, or 
were linked to the past conflict, vetting those guilty of ESR violations, including non-
state actors, can be an effective means of ensuring non-recurrence and of 
 
poverty-reduction projects, as a “success”); cf. Goldfrank, supra note 153, at 33 (describing in 2006 “a 
weak, fragmented civil society with little interest in institutionalized participation and little information 
about the recent laws”). 
 159.   CORREA, supra note 134, at 12–13. 
 160.   Cf. id. at 13 (noting that “the participation of women [in participatory budgeting and 
implementation] has been notably low” in Peru). 
 161.   Goldfrank, supra note 153, at 35. 
 162.   Cf. CORREA, supra note 134, at 14 (noting a study in which “58 percent of those surveyed did not 
identify community reparations projects implemented in their communities as reparations”). 
 163.   Id. at 14. 
 164.   Independent Expert, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights:  Report of the Independent 
Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, principle 36(a), U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005) (by Diane Orentlicher); see generally Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, 
Vetting to Prevent Future Abuses:  Reforming the Police, Courts, and Prosecutor’s Offices in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in JUSTICE AS PREVENTION:  VETTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES 
180 (Alexander Mayer-Rieckh & Pablo de Greiff eds., 2007). 
 165.   Mayer-Rieckh, supra note 164, at 188–91. 
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strengthening the rule of law.  This tactic was employed in Liberia in 2003, following 
the conclusion of its second Civil War.166  
 The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that “root causes” of 
the civil war included poverty, endemic corruption, and historical disputes over land 
distribution, all of which undermined access to education, justice, and socioeconomic 
opportunities.167  Research has revealed that Liberia’s infamous President during the 
conflict, Charles Taylor, granted timber concessions to increase political strongholds 
and patronage, to line his own pockets,168 and even in exchange for arms.169  The 
president of one such company, Oriental Timber Corporation, has faced prosecutions 
by Dutch authorities, which are ongoing, for his involvement in illegal arms deals and 
for war crimes.170 
 The complicit logging companies operating in Liberia during its five-year civil 
war, in addition to fueling conflict, also contributed to the violation of the ESRs of 
individuals and communities.  These violations constitute instances of governmental 
failures to protect ESRs.  Individuals were forcibly removed from their land,171 
violating their rights to an adequate standard of living, including rights to suitable 
housing and food, among others.  The companies, emboldened by the lack of 
government supervision over their activities, also committed widespread violations of 
national logging regulations, such as clearcutting and the cutting of undersized 
trees.172  This led to serious environmental effects, such as land erosion and the 
destruction of natural fauna habitats, potentially imperiling the land-based 
livelihoods of local communities.173  In addition, the logging companies’ egregious 
instances of tax evasion—companies paid only 2 to 3% of all tax due—was described 
by the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission as widespread and 
systematic.174  This affected the government’s available resources for development 
projects, albeit in circumstances where such money may not have been so used.175  
Finally, the logging companies breached contractual obligations to local communities 
 
 166.   REPUBLIC OF LIBER. TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, supra note 89, at 18. 
 167.   Id. at 16–17. 
 168.   JOHN WOODS ET AL., INVESTMENT IN THE LIBERIAN FOREST SECTOR:  A ROADMAP TO LEGAL 
FOREST OPERATIONS IN LIBERIA 1 (2008), available at http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/ 
index.php?pubID=519 (“[Oriental Timber Corporation] paid millions into Charles Taylor’s personal bank 
account; all for which they received tax credit.”). 
 169.   Stephanie L. Altman et al., Leveraging High-Value Natural Resources to Restore the Rule of Law:  
The Role of the Liberia Forest Initiative in Liberia’s Transition to Stability, in HIGH-VALUE NATURAL 
RESOURCES & POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING 337, 340 (Päivi Lujala & Siri Aas Rustad eds., 2012). 
 170.   Press Release, Global Witness, Global Witness Welcomes Dutch Court Decision to Retry Timber 
Baron Guus Kouwenhoven for Crimes Committed during Liberian War (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.global 
witness.org/library/global-witness-welcomes-dutch-court-decision-retry-timber-baron-guus-kouwenhoven-
crimes. 
 171.   REPUBLIC OF LIBER. TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, supra note 89, at 289–90. 
 172.   Id. at 290. 
 173.   See id. (“[F]orests that are clear cut will not naturally regenerate, rendering the area useless for 
future forestry.”). 
 174.   Id. 
 175.   Indeed, liability may not have accrued for breaches of ESRs where circumstances (such as a civil 
war) exist that render it materially impossible for a state to comply with its international obligations.  
INT’L LAW COMM’N, DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY 
WRONGFUL ACTS art. 23 (2001), reprinted in G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/83 (Jan. 28, 
2002). 
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in the logging areas, which obliged the companies to build hospitals, schools, and 
infrastructure, and to hire local individuals as unskilled laborers, further impacting 
local individuals’ rights to health, education, and work.176  While the fulfillment of 
those rights remains the responsibility of the State, this discussion illustrates the 
impacts that non-state actors can have on ESRs. 
 The Liberia Forest Initiative (LFI), a partnership between the government, 
international organizations, and civil society organizations, was set up in 2004 to 
collect statements regarding abuses by logging companies and their security forces 
during the civil war.177  It then developed vetting processes178 as part of broader 
reforms of the timber industry to encourage transparency and equitable and 
sustainable use of Liberia’s forests.179  A review of all timber concessions was 
undertaken by a committee staffed by government officials, local civil society 
organizations, United Nations staff, and LFI partners; this produced findings that all 
of the seventy existing concessions had been granted illegally.180  Twelve companies 
who had previously held concessions were found to have directly participated in the 
nation’s conflict, traded arms for timber, or otherwise aided and abetted social 
instability.181  The LFI profited from a newly installed government that was willing to 
institute the necessary reforms to set up a robust system aimed at preventing future 
recurrence of conflict, which had previously been fueled and financed by “conflict 
timber” as well as “blood diamonds.”182  The government declared all of the existing 
timber concessions null and void, and it embarked on creating a new process for 
granting concessions.183  According to the new process, a company that has been 
suspended or debarred, for example because of criminal convictions or failures to 
pay tax, is ineligible to bid for future tenders,184 and individuals with significant 
interests in companies involved in logging in Liberia prior to 2006 are required to file 
sworn statements setting out their involvement, and to cooperate with the 
government in recouping lost funds caused by illegal activity.185 
 
 176.   REPUBLIC OF LIBER. TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, supra note 89, at 290 (“[T]he 
University of Liberia granted 284,000 acres of University forest to [Oriental Trading Company], in 
exchange for $2 million USD in renovations to the University of Liberia and 50% of profits, according to 
President Taylor. No payments were ever made.”). 
 177.   About the Liberia Forest Initiative, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/forestry/lfi/29021/ 
en/ (last visited June 15, 2015). 
 178.   Duthie, supra note 3, at 189. 
 179.   Altman et al., supra note 169, at 337. 
 180.   See id. at 344–45 (noting that no Liberian timber concession granted met all four criteria 
necessary to maintain the concession). 
 181.   Id. at 345.  While not constituting ESR violations per se, the companies’ actions had severe 
economic and social consequences, as discussed below. 
 182.   Altman et al., supra note 169, at 340. 
 183.   Id. at 337. 
 184.   See, e.g., WOODS ET AL., supra note 168, at 4 (“Firstly, companies must not be suspended or 
debarred from bidding, for example, because of tax arrears or criminal convictions.  Secondly, the 
company must demonstrate that it is incorporated; involved with logging; has a main office in Monrovia; 
the officers/directors have not been penalized for violating corporate- or forestry-laws, and have not 
declared bankruptcy; and that the company is in good standing in payment of taxes, social security, forest- 
and trade-fees.”). 
 185.   Id. 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL  Volume 50, Issue 3 
492 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 50:3 
 
 Commercial vetting can also impact the integrity of a country’s legal system, and 
should thus be contemplated with caution.  For instance, opportunistic members of a 
post-conflict government may seek to vet economic actors and repudiate existing 
government contracts for improper purposes such as granting favors or encouraging 
new patronage networks.  This could adversely impact a country’s economy, as 
investors perceive a lack of commercial certainty and legal integrity.  A country could 
also face arbitration or litigation.   A vetted company may seek to sue a country for 
breach of an investment contract or for protection from state expropriations of their 
investments pursuant to international investment or trade treaties186 that ensure the 
rights of corporations to wide-reaching standards like “fair and equitable treatment.” 
187  Litigation for breaches of investment can lead to large compensation orders 
against States,188 which can seriously deplete public funds available for socioeconomic 
services.  This underlines the importance of carrying out vetting programs through 
transparent and principled processes.189  In this regard, the LFI’s engagement with a 
broad range of types of organizations helped to ensure a robust and principled 
vetting process.  To avoid litigation, such programs should also be designed so as to 
meet the requirements for legal repudiation of such contracts and with the goal of 
exposing illegal and corrupt practices, which can better protect the country from 
being sued by the investor under investment or trade treaties.190  
 While the LFI’s vetting policy is linked to the past civil conflict, it is illustrative 
of the role vetting can play in excluding individuals or corporations against which 
credible allegations of corruption, tax evasion,191 or other economic violence exist.  
Such violations affect a State’s ability to respect, protect, and fulfill ESRs by eroding 
state revenue and denying affected landholders and occupiers due process.  When 
coupled with broader sector reforms, vetting will often have a productive role to play 
 
186.  E.g., Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement arts. 10.7, 10.16, Aug. 5, 2004, 43 
I.L.M. 513. 
187. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1105, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(guaranteeing investors “treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable 
treatment”); Lise Johnson and Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, Host-State “Commitments” 
and the Myth of Stability in International Law, 24 AM. REV. INTL ARB. 361, 379 (2013) (“A number of 
[investor-state dispute settlement] cases have gone further and determined that when states contract with 
foreign investors, the existence of the regulatory framework gives rise to an implied promise that the 
investment will not be impacted by subsequent regulatory change.” (emphasis in original)) 
 188.   For instance, Pac Rim Cayman LLC is currently suing the state of El Salvador for $300,000 in 
compensation after the government refused to grant the company permission to commence a gold mine.  
Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12 (2009). 
 189.   While a principled process in itself will not immunize a State from the prospect of investor-state 
dispute settlement, the transparent process in Liberia’s case revealed the primary motivation for the 
country’s vetting was the illegal and corrupt practices of corporate actors. See REPUBLIC OF LIBER. 
TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM’N, 2 CONSOLIDATED FINAL REPORT 336–37, 372 (2009). This could 
enliven an emerging defense for host States, based on a company’s involvement in corrupt practices.  See, 
e.g., Jason Yackee, Investment Treaties and Investor Corruption:  An Emerging Defense for Host States?, 
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Oct. 19, 2012), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/10/19/investment-treaties-and-
investor-corruption-an-emerging-defense-for-host-states/ (discussing the agreement of Siemans, A.G. not 
to enforce a $200 million arbitral award against Argentina after the company was found to be heavily 
implicated in an international practice of bribing public officials). 
 190.   See Yackee, supra note 189 (noting the “potential benefits of a corruption defense” for host 
States through the example of Siemans, A.G.). 
 191.   The seventy logging companies in Liberia were later found to be “US$64 million in tax arrears.”  
WOODS ET AL., supra note 168, at 2. 
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in preventing the future mismanagement of a nation’s environmental resources, and 
the depletion of its tax reserves.  This example also illustrates the overlap of, and 
thus the need for greater coordination and interfacing between, the fields of 
transitional justice and business and human rights.  The unique opportunity of 
transitional contexts to redefine legal cultures should be used not only to address 
state human rights obligations, but also to set out appropriate legal protections and 
regulatory programs to ensure that business activities do not adversely affect the 
ESRs of community members.  The prospect of extending the obligations of 
businesses with regard to human rights beyond those set out in the 2011 Guiding 
Principles,192 upon which a United Nations Working Group has been tasked to begin 
consulting,193 may also create additional challenges and opportunities for the field of 
transitional justice. 
CONCLUSION 
 It is anachronistic to consider ESRs as outside the bounds of transitional justice.  
Doing so risks skewing understandings of past atrocities, which in turn affects 
transitional justice’s ability to prevent their recurrence.  This Article has sought to 
contribute to the field of transitional justice by reinforcing the indivisibility of ESRs, 
and by analyzing some of the broader transitional justice mechanisms that States can 
employ to meet their ESR obligations during transitional periods.  Determining 
which types of rights should or should not be included in a particular case will 
depend on the facts on the ground and the capacities of the specific transitional 
justice mechanism concerned.  However, such decisions should not be guided by 
erroneous notions of ESRs as being less important than civil and political rights.  
Government failures to respect and protect ESRs are generally discrete enough to be 
included, where relevant, in the mandates of truth commissions, prosecutions, 
reparations programs, and vetting processes.  Breaches of state obligations to fulfill 
human rights in specific communities or regions can be addressed in some instances:  
Truth commissions can acknowledge such failures and recommend appropriate 
reforms; reparations can remedy the effects of failures to fulfill ESRs on a limited 
scale; and collective reparations and decentralized governance processes can 
empower communities to more actively direct the course of their development and 
respond to socioeconomic issues that may have been ignored by previous national 
government policies.  Similarly, vetting processes can improve the government’s 
ability to fulfill ESRs by excluding public and private actors whose practices eroded 
public funds, damaged socioeconomic infrastructure and services, or otherwise 
negatively affected a population’s ESRs.  Such breaches should therefore not be 
automatically excluded from truth commission mandates or other transitional justice 
procedures.  Widespread or nationwide failures to fulfill ESRs, on the other hand, 
may be more difficult for transitional justice mechanisms to address.  Nonetheless, 
transitional contexts present unique opportunities for reinvention of legal and 
political cultures.  To automatically exclude consideration of ESRs—even state 
 
 192.   Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights:  Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework:  Rep. of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie). 
 193.   H.R.C. Res. 26/22, para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/22 (July 15, 2014). 
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obligations to fulfill ESRs—at such a moment in a nation’s history is to miss an 
important opportunity for the improvement of a nation’s socioeconomic conditions 
and the strengthening of its commitment to all human rights.  Ultimately, transitional 
justice can no longer ignore that ESRs articulate non-negotiable and clearly defined 
standards, which often hold the key to stable and sustainable transitions. 
